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RECENT DECISIONS
ATTORNEY-FEONY CoNVcTIoN-DISBARMENT .- Appellant, an attorney, was con-
victed in a United States District Court for New York, of the crime of conspiracy
to use the mails to defraud, a felony under Federal Law.1 In New York conspiracy
to commit a crime is only a misdemeanor.2 Appellant -was disbarred under the
Judiciary Law3 providing such discipline for an attorney convicted of a felony. On
appeal from the order of disbarment, hteld, two judges dissenting, the term "felony"
as used in the Judiciary Law does not include an offense defined as a felony by
Federal statute, which, under the laws of New York, would be only a misdemeanor.
Judgment reversed. In re Donegan, 282 N. Y. 285, 26 N. E. (2d) 260 (1940).
The courts have been inclined to construe statutes providing for disbarment of
attorneys on conviction of a felony in such a manner as to include convictions in
the courts of other states or of the United States.4 This is generallys true of those
crimes which would also be felonies if committed in the state where the statute is
being applied.6 But when the offense which is a felony under Federal law is only a
misdemeanor or less under the laws of the state where the statute is being applied
some difficulty arises. Some jurisdictions hold that if the offense is a felony under
Federal Law but not under state law, the attorney will not be summarily disbarred
under the statute providing for disbarment of attorneys upon a conviction of a
felony.7 Other jurisdictions hold that if an attorney is convicted of a felony any-
where, he will be summarily disbarred under the statute, even though the offense
is less than a felony in the jurisdiction where he is disbarred.8 Until the decision
1. 18 U. S. C. § 88 (1926), 35 STAT. 1096 (1909); 18 U. S. C. § 541 (1926), 46 STAT.
1029 (1930).
2. N. Y. PmzAL LAw (1909) § 5S0.
3. N. Y. JuDrcmRy LAw § 88 sub. 3. "Whenever an attorney and counsellor-at-law
shall be convicted of a felony, there may be presented to the appellate division of the
Supreme Court a certified or exemplified copy of the judgment of such conviction, and
thereupon the name of the person so convicted shall, by order of the court, be stricken
from the roll of attorneys."
§ 477--"Any person being an attorney and counsellor-at-law, who shall be convicted
of a felony, shall upon such conviction, cease to be an attorney and counsellor-at-law,
or to be competent to practice as such.'
4. State ex rel. Sanford v. Riddle, 213 Ala. 430, 105 So. 259 (1925); In re Thompson,
37 Cal. App. 344, 174 Pac. 86 (1918); In re Kerl, 32 Idaho 737, 188 Pac. 40 (1920).
5. But see In re Ebbs, 150 N. C. 44, 63 S. E. 190, 196 (1903) where the court said:
"We do not hold that for the commission of a felony, or other infamous crime, . . .
committed in another state, he should not be disbarred by the court of this state. That
question is not presented.... We simply hold that the statute ... does not impose upon
the court the duty ... to disbar an attorney because he has been 'convicted' in the courts
of another state or of the United States."
6. Bames v. District Court of Appeal, 178 Cal. 500, 173 Pac. 1100 (1918). Re Shephard,
35 Cal. App. 492, 170 Pac. 442 (1917).
7. People ex rel. Attorney General v. Brayton, 100 Colo. 92, 65 P. (2d) 1438 (1937);
State ex rel. Grievance Committee of State Bar Association v. Biggs, 52 Or. 435, 97 Pac.
713 (1908). In the Biggs case the Court held that because there was no offense -nown
to the law of the state as conspiracy to suborn perjury, an attorney's conviction of that
crime in a federal court would not warrant disbarment.
8. In re Minner, 133 Kan. 789, 3 P._(2d) 473 (1931).
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in the principal case, the latter view seemed to be the view of the New York courts.0
It is interesting to note that in the New York cases there were grounds justifying
the discipline meted out to the attorney other than the conviction of the crime.
Conviction of a felony is not the only reason for disbarring an attorney. While the
Appellate Division must o disbar an attorney upon his conviction of a felony, it
may" disbar him for other reasons. Therefore an attorney guilty of wilful misconduct,
even though it were not a felony under the New York law, could nevertheless, in
the discretion of the court, (and undoubtedly would)' 2 be disbarred by the Appellate
Division. The New York cases involved such wilful misconduct. In the principal
case, however, the respondents submitted that any violation of the law on their part
was unwitting and technical, pointing out that the indictments resulted from the
collapse of the New York City guaranteed mortgage companies in the year 1933 and
particularly the suspension of the State Title and Mortgage Company, of which the
respondents were officers and directors.' 3 Hence the issue of the principal case is
squarely presented for the first time to the New York Court of Appeals.1 4
The decision in the principal case, reversing what had appeared to be the rule
of New York courts, finds support in prior cases. New York courts have consistently
held,15 in cases where statutes placed limitations on the privileges of persons con-
9. The court in Matter of Ackerson, 218 App. Div. 388, 392, 218 N. Y. Supp. 654, 658
(1st Dep't 1926) said "This court has always held that it was obligated under § 471
of the Judiciary Law to disbar an attorney upon his conviction in the Federal Courts
of a crime created a felony by the laws of the United States. See Matter of Kaufmann,
195 App. Div. 830, 187 N. Y. Supp. 213 (1st Dep't 1921); Matter of Felder, 214 App,
Div. 57, 209 N. Y.'Supp. 716 (1st Dep't 1925).
10. N. Y. JuDmcIm.Y LAW (1937) § 88 sub. 3.
11. N. Y. JurczLARY LAw (1937) § 88 sub. 3 "... and the appellate division of the
Supreme Court in each department is authorized to censure, suspend from practice or
remove from office any attorney and counsellor-at-law admitted to practice as such who
is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime or misdemeanor
or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice."
12. Matter of Ackerson, 218 App. Div. 388, 391, 218 N. Y. Supp. 654, 658 (1st dep't.
1926). "So that, even if there were any substance in the respondent's claim that the
conviction ought to be treated as a misdemeanor, the character of the offense would war-
rant disbarment."
13. Matter of Donegan, 256 App. Div. 535, 536, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 866, 867 (1st Dept,
1926).
14. Although the Court of Appeals, speaking through Cardozo, C.J., in Matter of
Kaufmann, 245 N. Y. 423, 426, 157 N. E. 730, 731 (1927), had indicated by dictum that
there was some doubt, about the rule that an attorney convicted of a felony under federal
law must be disbarred under the statute, even though the offense would be only a mis-
demeanor under the laws of New York State, this rule, i.e. that such conviction required
disbarment, has been regarded as the law of New York and has, been cited as such and
been followed by the courts of other states. In re Minner, 133 Kan. 739, 3 P. (2d) 473,
474 (1931); State v. Estes, 130 Tex. 425, 427, 109 S. W. (2d) 167, 170 (1937).
15. People v. Gutterson, 244 N. Y. 243, 250, 155 N. E. 113, 115 (1926), where it was
sought to punish the defendant under the Penal Law, sec. 2189 which provides that the
court may impose a sentence for the longest period fixed by law (instead of an indeter-
minate sentence) for the crime of grand larceny if the defendant was previously "convicted
of a crime punishable by imprisonment in a state prison", the court said, "There can be
[Vol. 9
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victed of felonies (though not in the case of the disbarment statute) that the felony
of which the person is convicted must be such an offense as would also be a felony
under the laws of New York. Similarly, in cases where no statutes were involved,
courts have made like interpretations. Thus, in People ex rel. Athins v. Jfcnings'0
the relator was convicted of a felony. His sentence was commuted by the Governor
on the "express condition that if the said B'urd R. Atkins shall hereafter be convicted
of a felony, committed during the period of his discharge by reason hereof and the
date of the expiration of the full term hereby commuted, he shall be deemed as an
escaped convict." It was later sought to hold him for having been convicted of a
crime in Michigan, and it was held that the conditional commutation was not violated
unless the offense would be a felony if committed in this state.
In view of these holdings of the Court of Appeals, it is difficult to oppose the
reversal of the Appellate Division. Moreover, where the facts were reversed, the
Appellate Division has (by analogy at least) held as in the principal case.' 7
From the standpoint of reason also, the decision in the principal case seems to
be thoroughly correct. The court in its opinion stresses the fact that penal statutes
must be strictly constrded. The court claims that while disbarment is not, strictly
speaking, a punishment for crime but only the withdrawal of a privilege, the re-
quirement of automatic and irrevocable disbarment for life is in effect a consequence
most severe, and partakes of the nature of punishment. Certainly if it is once
admitted that disbarment involves criminal punishment then, under the rule of strict
construction of penal statutes, it follows that the disbarment statute cannot operate
to disbar an attorney. But even if it should be doubted that disbarment partakes of
the nature of punishment, nevertheless we must remember that the only reason why
a statute is subjected to a strict or a liberal construction is that the type of con-
struction utilized gives effect to the legislative intent. Therefore ascertaining the
legislative meaning in any type of statute (penal or otherwise) is the ultimate goal
of the courts. And it certainly seems that in the principal case the court has taken
pains to give effect to the legislative intent. It would be an anomalous situation
indeed, if the court were required summarily to disbar for life without the possibility
of modification for an offense which is a felony under the laws of the United States,
but which if punished by the laws of this state would permit of a hearing and less
severe results.' 8
no doubt . . . that the legislature could not reasonably have intended by the ue of
the words 'crime punishable by imprisonment in a state prison', to include a crime which
is not so punishable under the laws of this state." In Matter of Cohen, 278 N. Y. 584, 16
N. E. (2d) 111 (1938) involving Surrogate's Court Act, sec. 94, which provides: "No
person is competent to serve as an executor, administrator, testamentary trustee or guardian,
who is . . . (4) a felon", the court held that the respondent who had been convicted of
a felony in the Federal Courts, was not a felon within the meaning of the Surrogate's
Court Act.
16. See 248 N. Y. 46, 52, 161 N. E. 326, 328 (1928).
17. Matter of Stein, 199 App. Div. 673, 191 N. Y. Supp. 419 (2d Dep't 1921). An
attorney was convicted of what was known as a "high misdemeanor" in New Jersey.
The same crime in New York would have been a felony. The Court held that the
attorney must be disbarred as having been convicted of a felony.
18. Indeed, the courts of Colorado are inclined to examine the merits in all cases of
this type. Thus in People ex rel. Attorney General v. Lasska, 101 Colo. 221, 72 P. (2d)
693 (1937), the court said: "Where a member of the Bar is convictcd of a felony, a
1940]
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The dissenting opinion in the principal case sets forth19 the argument that the
majority opinion makes the United States a foreign sovereignty as regards the
several states.
Punishing a crime committed against the federal government is for the courts
of the United States. But determining who shall be qualified to practice law in the
courts of New York State, is for the State of New York to decide. Each sovereignty
exercises jurisdiction over its distinct subject matter though with reference to the
same person. There is no conflict of jurisdiction here. Each is supreme in its sphere.
The dissenting opinion evidently fears that an attorney guilty of such a crime
as to be deemed a felony under federal law shall escape the just consequences of
his actions. Such a fear can only result from a failure to grasp the full scope of
the disbarment statute. The Judiciary Law places the power of disbarring attorneys
in the discretion 20 of the Appellate Division and the only instance in which resort
to discretion is foreclosed is in the case of a felony. The majority opinion decides
only that the Appellate Division must go into the merits of the case. It in no sense
holds that a person convicted of an offense against the Federal Government cannot
be disbarred merely because such an offense would be only a misdemeanor under
the laws of New York State.
CONTRACTS-BENEFICIARIES-EFFECTS OF REscIssION UPON RIGHTS OF TniiRD
PARTY BENEFcIARY -Defendant agreed with co-defendant to buy the stock of a
brewing company. The defendant trust company was appointed escrow holder to
receive and disburse the money and the instruments required to consummate the
transaction. The escrow instrument provided that the creditors of the brewing
company, including plaintiff's assignor, were to be paid from the money deposited in
escrow. The defendant paid sufficient money into escrow to pay the creditors named
but the original escrow was cancelled and a new one created which omitted the
plaintiff from the list of creditors. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment sustaining, a
demurrer to his complaint based on the theory that he was a third party beneficiary,
held, judgment affirmed. The parties to the escrow having rescinded it prior to the
time plaintiff attempted to enforce any rights under it, the complaint does not state
a cause of action. Orloff v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 102 P. (2d) 562 (Cal. 1940).
This case involves the hypothetical question mentioned by the court in Lawrence
v. Fox' whether the promisee in a third party beneficiary contract can release the
Colorado legislative enactment operates to disqualify him from 'practicing as an attorney
in any of the courts of this state.' 35 C. S. A. c. 48, § 533 (C. L. § 7144) .... But where
the conviction has been in a court of another jurisdiction, as here, and the attorney whose
discipline is sought formally invokes that right, we have deemed it consonant with justice
to accord him the privilege of denying his guilt, notwithstanding his conviction in a
'foreign' court and to plead facts and circumstances reasonably indicating that he did not
have a fair trial or which import innocence rather than guilt, and have inquiry made
under our supervision." See also People ex rel. Attorney General v. Brayton, 100 Colo.
92, 65 P. (2d) 1438 (1937); People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Burton, 39 Colo. 164,
88 Pac. 1063 (1907).
19. Matter of Donegan, 282 N. Y. 285, 295, 26 N. E. (2d) 260, 264 (1940).
20. N. Y. JuDicLARY LAW (1937) § 88, sub. 2. See note 2, supra.
1. "It was also insisted that Holly could have discharged the defendant from his
[Vol, 9
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promisor from the promisor's obligation under the contract to the beneficiary.
Two problems arise out of the question whether a contract made for the benefit
of a third party can be rescinded without the consent of the beneficiary: (1) In the
interval between the making of the contract and the acceptance and adoption of HE
by the beneficiary, is it revocable without his consent? (2) After it has come to the
knowledge of the beneficiary and he has assented to it, is it so revocable?
As can readily be seen, the instant case deals with the first problem. It holds as
a corollary to the statute of California 2 that the contract can be rescinded. The
promisee could have discharged the promisor, before the beneficiary had done any-
thing to show that he had ratified the agreement. In this holding it would seem to be
in accord with the majority of the courts,3 but the question is far from being settled.
In opposition to this majority, there are a number of courts that lay down the
rule that an agreement cannot be rescinded by the parties thereto without the assent
of the beneficiary, even before the latter becomes aware of the agreement or accepts
the same. They reason that at the consummation of the agreement between the
promise, though it was intended by both parties for the benefit of the plaintiff and
therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain this suit for the recovery of a demand
over which he had no control. . . . It is enough that the plaintiff did not release the
defendant from his promise, and whether he could or could not is a question not now
necessarily involved." Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
2. "A contract for the benefit of a third party may be enforced by him at any time
before the parties thereto rescind it." Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1937) § 1559. This statute
is similar to Section 749 of the Field Code, which has been adopted in a number of states.
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1939) § 7472; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1913) § 5341.
3. Thompson v. Packer, 83 Ind. 96 (1832) ; International Trust Co. v. Keefe Mfg. Co., 40
Colo. 440, 91 Pac. 915 (1907); Clark v. Nelson, 211 Ala. 199, 112 So. 819 (1927); Trinble v.
Strother, 25 Ohio St. 378 (1874). Defendant agreed with another person to pay a debt to
plaintiff. Before plaintiff acted on the promise, the parties rescinded, held, rescison was a
good defense. Jordan v. Laverty, 53 N. J. L. 15, 20 AtL 832 (1890), held, a promisor,
entering into a partnership and agreeing to assume one half of the debts, could not be
held liable to a creditor, where the partnership agreement was rescinded before acceptance
by the latter. See aiso Spalding v. Henshaw, 80 Ky. 55, 44 Am. Rep. 463 (18S2) where it
was held that, if a contract whereby money is intrusted by a debtor to another, to be paid
over to a creditor, is rescinded before the creditor learns of it, he cannot recover therein.
This case would seem to be an illusory beneficiary case, whereby a man can tell his agent
to do something and then change his mind before he, the agent, does it. Kelly v. Roberts,
40 N. Y. 432 (1869). The cases reveal that the courts do not agree as to the nature of the
third party beneficiary's right, the theory which underlies it, or the basis on which it rests.
It has been said that "the grounds upon which the cases place the right of the third
party to enforce the contract and the conditions under which it will be enforced, are about
as numerous as the cases passing on the question." Donaldson v. Benight, 105 0ka. 103,
232 Pac. 116, 118 (1924). For a review of the conflict between the various theories upon
which the right of the third party to recover is based in New York, see: Hartley v.
Harrison, 24 N. Y. 270 (1861). Dissenting opinion by Comstock, J., stated: The considera-
tion proceeding wholly from the promisee, he could release and discharge the obligation. In
Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N. Y. 30 (1881), dissenting opinion by Earl, J., argued: The
promise of the promisor is not collateral to the obligation of the promisee, but is an orig-
inal promise, and the promisee could not release the promisor from performance.
1940]
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promisor and the promisee, the law operates upon their acts and creates a "privity"
in the third party beneficiary. It is then illogical to hold that the status of the bene-
ficiary, who is in privity can be changed without his consent.4 A Colorado Court,
in support of the minority view has held that upon the assumption of a mortgage
by the purchaser, he became bound by the obligation, "and an immediate right to
enforce it vested in the beneficiaries which right could not be divested by the mort-
gagor and the purchaser without their consent." 5 The court in Lawrence v. Fox
while not finding it necessary to decide the point, stated that it would be difficult
for the promisee to discharge a judgment rendered against him in an action by the
beneficiary for breach of the promisor's promise. And the court continued to argue
that since he could not discharge the judgment he could not discharge the promise
which was made for the third party's benefit and presumptively accepted by him
until his dissent was shown.6
However, according to the weight of authority, the parties to a contract entered
into for the benefit of a third person may rescind, vary, or abrogate the contract as
they see fit, without the assent of the third person at any time before the contract
is accepted,7 adopted or acted upon by him. Thus, the majority view would seem
to be in agreement with the principal case and at variance with the dicta in Lau'rence
V. Fox.
The reasoning involved in the majority view point is well stated in Gilbert v.
Sandersons where the court states that if the parties have the power to enter into
a contract for the benefit of a third party, they have the power to rescind that
agreement unless, prior to such rescission the beneficiary has expressly or impliedly
indicated that he accepts the contract. It is only by this acceptance that he acquires
the rights and assumes the burdens incident to the contract. The principal case finds
support in the Restatement of Contracts. 9 Under this section the promisor and
promisee may terminate or modify the contract by mutual agreement up to the time
the creditor beneficiary brings suit against the promisor or changes his position
materially in reliance upon the contract, unless the promisee's discharge would operate
as a fraud against the beneficiary.1°
4. Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N. W. 440 (1903). See also on this point
Bay v. Williams, 112 Ill. 91, 1 N. E. 340 (1884), where it was held that the third party's
rights came into being at the time the contract for his benefit was made, and that it could
not be rescinded without his consent. Cf. Hartman v. Pistorious, 248 Ill. 568, 94 N. , 131
(1911), which was distinguished from Bay v. Williams on the ground that in the latter
case the promisee had conveyed title to the promisor, while in this instance there was.a
rescission before such conveyance.
5. Starbird v. Cranston, 24 Colo. 20, 48 Pac. 652, 655 (1897).
6. See Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268, 274 (1859). Also Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N. Y.
257, 262, 22 N. E. 756, 758 (1889).
7. It is interesting to note at this point that a different rule from the principal case
has been invoked with respect to infant beneficiaries. "Where the parties are all adults, a
promise by one, upon a sufficient consideration, for the benefit of a third party, may, before
acceptance by him, be abrogated by the immediate parties to the contract. Here, appellees,
for whose benefit the promises were made were infants. No formal or express acceptance
was necessary on their part." No acceptance seems to be necessary by an infant beneficiary;
it will be presumed. Waterman v. Morgan, 114 Ind. 237, 16 N. E. 590, 591 (1888).
8. 56 Iowa 349, 9 N. W. 293 (1888).
9. RESTATEMTNT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 143.
10. For the necessity of 'consideration as a prerequisite to the power of the promisee to
[Vol. 9
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In New York there does not seem to be any decision of the Court of Appeals
directly dealing with the effect of a rescission before the adoption of the contract by
the third party beneficiary."' There is, however, some dicta, repudiating the dictum
of Lawrence v. Fox, and which would seem to indicate that the New York courts are
in agreement with the principal case.12 It was held in Dinning v. Leavitt,13 and
again in Crowe v. Leseinz4 that the right of the third party beneficiary was of a
derivative and imperfect character, and subject to the equities existing between the
original promisor and promisee. The court held that the destruction of the con-
sideration of the promise in the Leavitt case and the rescission of the contract in
the Lewin case barred the beneficiary from any right of action. It should be noted
that the beneficiary was not a party to the action in the Lewin case. Perhaps the
case most nearly approaching the answer to the problem of when the right to enforce
the agreement vests in the beneficiary in New York is Gifford v. Corrigan.'5 In that
case there had been the filing of a lis pendens by the beneficiary, before the parties
had rescinded the agreement. The court held that this served to give notice that the
agreement had been adopted by the beneficiary and that after such notice the con-
tract could no longer be rescinded. Thus, all the case really does decide is that the
contract cannot be rescinded after there has been an assent by the beneficiary; it
does not decide that it can be so rescinded before there has been such a consent.
The effect of the holding has been to leave the law in New York as doubtful on the
question as it had been prior to this decision.
discharge the promisor, see (1939) 38 M ca. L. RrV. 1093. Stanfield v. W. C. McBride
Inc., 149 Kan. $63, 88 P. (2d) 1002 (1939), where it was held that the promisor and
promisee may by agreement change the contract so that it no longer protects a third
party beneficiary, not identifiable at the time, and that the third party beneficiary cannot
raise the question of want of consideration for the deletion of the omnibus clause. The
third party cannot raise the lack of consideration between the parties to the contract as a
defense to rescission of the contract.
11. The courts seem to agree that after the third party accepts, adopts, or acts upon
the contract entered into for his benefit, the parties thereto cannot rescind the same
without his consent, so as to deprive him of its benefits. Richardson v. Short, 201 Iowa
561, 202 N. W. 836 (1925); State Bank v. Schulze, 51 N. D. 66, 199 N. W. 138 (1924);
Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N. Y. 257, 22 N. E. 756 (18S9); Putney v. Franham, 27 Wis. 187
(1870) ; see also 53 A. L. R. 178. What act or acts constitute acceptance, however, presents
an involved question. The filing of a [is pendens is considered by some courts evidence of
an adoption. Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N. Y. 257, 22 N. E. 756 (1889). The third party's
right in cases where there has been an adoption by him, has been predicated on something
akin to estoppel. Crowell v. Currier, 27 N. J. Eq. 152, ag'zd 27 N. J. Eq. 650 (1876).
"What it should be, whether a bare assent communicated to the promisor, or some decisive
act of the third party by which his original position and rights have been changed in reli-
ance upon the promise, before the equities between the contractors became burdened vith
a right to interfere and be heard belonging to the third party, we do not decide because
it is not necessary." Wheat v. Rice, 97 N. Y. 296 (1884).
12. Comley v. Dazian, 114 N. Y. 161, 167, 21 N. E. 135, 137 (1889); Knickerbocker
Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 78 N. Y. 137, 151, 13 Hun. 321 (1879); Moore v. Ryder, 65 N. Y.
438, 442 (1875).
13. 85 N. Y. 35, 39 Am. Rep. 617 (1881).
14. 95 N. Y. 423 (1884).
15. 117 N. Y. 257 (1889).
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The courts in discussing the rights of the parties to rescind the contract, whether
before or after its acceptance by the beneficiary, make no distinction between the
creditor-beneficiaries and donee-beneficiaries. 16 However, the Restatement of the
Law of Contracts does make such a distinction, and in Sec. 142, a distinct advantage
is granted to the donee-beneficiary; the parties cannot rescind without his consent, in
the absence of such a reservation in the contract. The reason for this would seem
to be that a rescission in the case of a donee-beneficiary is like the attempted revo-
cation of a gift. As a gift is a pure benefit to the donee there seems no reason why
his assent should not be presumed, unless and until he expresses his dissent. 17 This,
substantially, is the reason given by Williston in his work on Contracts.18 However,
it would seem that the position of contracts to render performance to a third person
is so clearly established that the rights which arise should be determined by princi-
ples of contract law, and not by principles of gift or trust.
On the whole question it seems to be more logical not to permit rescission without
the beneficiaries' assent 'if the right of the third party is recognized as a contract
right; and such is the case in New York.19 If the promise runs directly to the bene-
ficiary, it seems illogical to hold that it might be rescinded without his consent,
If the right of the parties to rescind before adoption of the contract by the third
party beneficiary be upheld, practical difficulties arise. What constitutes such adop-
tion? Is'knowledge of the contract by the beneficiary enough? Is there a presumed
assent where there is benefit to be derived by the beneficiary? 20
A holding forbidding the rescission of a third party beneficiary contract would not
be inequitable to the promisor, for it would be subject to the equities and inequities
of the original agreement.
21
In reaching a decision, the theory from which the beneficiary's right is derived is
16. 2 WLisroN, CONTRAC S (rev. ed. 1936) § 396B. See also on this point (1937) 12
Wis. L. Rzv. 141.
17. Accord: Continental Ins. Co. v. Ferra, 109 N. J. Eq. 374, 157 Atl. 558 (1931).
18. 2 WrausroN, CoNTActs (rev. ed. 1936) § 396.
19. The theory upon which a third person is allowed to maintain an action upon a
promise to another to pay his debt, is that the promise is in legal effect a promise to pay,
such third person. Barlow v. Myers, 64 N. Y. 41 (1871).
20. In Henderson v. McDonald, 84 Ind. 149 (1882), acceptance was presumed where
the promise was of benefit to the third party. It has been held that A and B may modify
or terminate their contract by mutual agreement up to the time that the beneficiary
changes his position materially in reliance upon the contract. Marstain v. Kircher, 190
Minn. 78, 250 N. W. 727 (1933). The court followed RESTATZ MIT, CONTRA TS (1932) §
143-the fact that the third party accepted interest from the beneficiary was not held to
be a reliable change of position. Section 143 required a change of position by the bene-
ficiary. Cf. Weatherford v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 94 S. W. (2d) 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
The beneficiary had also brought suit before the parties tried to terminate the contract.
The court held that the beneficiary had accepted by receiving interest from the promisor.
21. "There is no justice in holding that an action on such a promise is not subject to
the equities between the original parties springing out of the transaction or contract
between them. It may be true that the promise cannot be released or discharged by the
promisee, after the rights of the party for whose benefit it is said to have been made have
attached. But it would be contrary to justice or good sense to hold that one who comes
in by what Allen, J., in Vrooman v. Turner, calls the 'privity of substitution' should acquire
a better right against the promisor than the promisee himself had." Dunning v. Leavitt,
85 N. Y. 30, 35 (1881).
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all-important. If it is contractual, though derivative, logic precludes a rescission
without the consent of the third party. To the writer, therefore, the holding of the
minority is both more equitable and more logical than the holding of the majority,
in the absence of a statute2 2 such as the California Court acted upon in the principal
case.
COPYRIGHT-UNFAIR COMPETITION-UNAUTHORIZED BROAnCASTING OF PHONOGRAPH
REco.Ds NOT ENJoiNABLE.-Phonograph records of selections arranged and performed
by Paul Whiteman and his orchestra were manufactured and sold by R.CA. Manu-
facturing Co. and its predecessors. The records bore the legend: "Not licensed for
Radio Broadcasting." On appeal from a decree enjoining the unauthorized broad-
casting of the records by several of the defendants, held, no injunction may issue as
the sale of the records ended any rights of control over the use of the records
which may have belonged to the complainants. R.C.A. Manufact uring Co. v. Paee
Whiteman, N. Y. L. J., Aug. 21, 1940 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
In its decision the court assumed the existence of a "common-law property" in the
performances of an orchestra' and even admitted that a performance over the radio
is not an abandonment of such property right.2 It, nevertheless, concluded that the
"common-law property" in these performances ended vith the sale of "records".
The sale constituted "publication" sufficient to destroy any common-law monopoly
which might have belonged to the complainants. 3  The records were not copy-
rightable since the interpretative rendition of a musical composition is not subject
to the protection of the Copyright Act. 4 The attempted restriction upon the
uses of the record by the legend was ineffective. The law of servitudes upon chattels
22. CA.. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 1559.
1. An artist before the publication of his work has the exclusive right to pvssers, wue
and dispose of his intellectual production. These rights are generally referred to as
"common-law copyright". See Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N. Y. 532, 537 (1872). Comment
(1939) 8 FoRDHAm L. Rnv. 400. It is not necessary for the establishment of a common law
copyright that the entire ultimate product should be the work of a single creator; such
rights may be acquired by one who perfects the original work or substantially adds to it.
Aronson v. Baker, 43 N. J. Eq. 365, 12 Ati. 177 (1888) (musical selections); Fleron v.
Lackaye, 14 N. Y. Supp. 292 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (translation of a novel); Walter v. Lane,
[190D] A. C. 539 (report of a speech).
2. Upon "publication" all common-law property rights in a work are lost. See Caliga
v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U. S. 182, 188 (1909); Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v.
Jewelers' Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N. Y. 241, 247, 49 N. E. 872, 873 (1898). However,
"publication" is a term of art. In the following cases it was held that the plaintifs
conduct did not constitute "publication": Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424, 435 (1912) (pro-
duction of a play); Nutt v. National Institute, 31 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) (delivery
of a lecture); McCarthy v. White, 259 Fed. 364 (S. D. N. Y. 1919) (rendition of a
musical composition); Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D.
Mlass., 1934) (radio broadcast).
3. See Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U. S. 182, 188 (1909); Je%%elers' Mer-
cantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N. Y. 241, 247, 49 N. E. 872, 873
(1898).
4. 35 ST-T. 1076 (1909), amended 37 STAT. 488 (1912), 17 U. S. C. A. § 5 (1927).
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has not yet expanded sufficiently to sanction such a restriction.5 It would be un-
reasonable, therefore, to forbid any uses to the owner of the record which were open
to anyone who might choose to copy the rendition from the record.
The lower court granted the complainants relief, basing its decision primarily on
the ground that the defendants' acts constituted unfair competition.0 Support for
the decision can be found in the cases of Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station,7
a Pennsylvania case in which the facts were identical with those presented in the
principal case, and International News Service v. Associated Press.8 The Supreme
Court of the United States in the News case attached a new branch to the law of
unfair competition,0 and the Pennsylvania court in the Waring case followed the
reasoning of the News case.
Prior to the News case a party could obtain relief in the courts against only one
general type of unfair competition, namely, that which involved misrepresentation or
"passing off".' o Competition is not unlawful per se and it was decided very early in
our law that the loss of business solely because of competition is not actionable. 11
However, where a party directs trade from a competitor by "passing off" his goods
as those of the other the latter may obtain equitable relief. 12 Where the element
of "passing off" was not to be found the party was unable to obtain relief in the
courts in the absence of other tortious conduct no matter how unscrupulous was the
defendant's conduct.' 3
In the News case the Court was presented with a unique situation. The com-
plainant was in the business of gathering news and distributing it to its member
newspapers. The defendant, a competitor, copied the news gathered by the plaintiff
from bulletins issued by the latter and from early editions of the newspapers of com-
plainant's members and distributed it to its own clients. The court declared the de-
fendant's conduct to be unfair competition and approved an injunction which re-
strained the defendant from taking the complainant's news "until its commercial
5. See R.C.A. Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, N. Y. L. J., Aug. 21, 1940 (C. C. A. 2d,
1940); see Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels (1928) 41 HAuv. L. REV. 945; (1940)
17 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 304, 307, n. 23. Contra: Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 32?
Pa. 433, 194 AtI. 631 (1937); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E. D. N. C. 1939).
6. R.C.A. Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. 787 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
7. 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937).
8. 248 U. S. 215 (1918).
9. DERFNBERG, TRADE-MaKR ProTcEroN AND UNFAIR TRAING (1936) 93; Haines, Efforts
to Define Unfair Competition (1919) 29 YAL L. J. 122.
10. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (C. C. A. 6th, 1900);
See Chafee, Unfair Competition (1940) 53 HARv. L. Rav. 1289, 1206; Handler, False and
Misleading Advertising (1929) 39 Y'L L. J. 22, 35.
11. Anonymous, Y. B. 11 Hen. IV, f. 47, pl. 21 (C. P. 1410); Wyman, Competition
and the Law (1902) 15 HIv. L. R-v. 56. But see Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119
N. W. 946 (1909).
12. Chafee, note 10 supra.
13. Note 10 supra. Many courts give relief where there has been no "passing off"
but a misappropriation provided that the methods employed in the process of misappropria-
tion are tortious per se, or involve wrongful or dishonest means: Uproar Co. v. N.B.C.,
81 F. (2d) 373 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936) (breach of contract); Board of Trade of Chicago v.
Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236 (1905) (breach of trust); (1940) 17 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REv. 304, 305.
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value as news to the complainant and all of its members has passed away." 14 The
News case differed from those preceding it in that relief is granted not against mis-
representation but against misappropriation. Justice Pitney expressed the opinion
that a person cannot "reap where it (sic) has not sov '1 and that "each party is
under a duty so to conduct its own business as not necessarily or unfairly to injure
that of the other." 16 The language of the opinion is loose and if it were broadly
applied the law of unfair competition would embrace the regulation of business
methods by imposing sanctions upon unsportsmanlike business behavior. Conse-
quently, the News case has been limited in application to its own peculiar fact
situation.17
The district court attempted to pick out a remedy from the unformed law of unfair
competition to apply to the situation before it. The essence of the complaint herein
is not that the defendants' business methods are inherently reprehensible but that
the defendants do not recognize in the plaintiffs any monopoly in the recordings.
That protection should be afforded the complainants might well be argued. But the
creation of legal monopoly is the province of the legislature in applying the consti-
tutional mandate, "To promote the Progress of .. . useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings,"' 8
not of the judiciary by extending the law of unfair competition. There is no reason
for expanding one branch of the law to fit the deficiencies of another.
INDErINrrY-STATUToRY Linrmrr.--Plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile in-
volved in a collision with defendant railway company, sued the owner of the auto-
mobile and the railroad company. The owner filed a cross-complaint against the
driver of the car, who was using it with his express permission. The cross-complaint
was grounded solely on section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.1 The theory of
the complaint was that because of that section, the owner was legally responsible to
plaintiff for the driver's act and the latter should indemnify the owner. On motion
to strike the defense to the cross-complaint as insufficient, held, motion denied as
cross-complaint itself was bad. A driver is not bound to indemnify a bailor of an
automobile against liability under the statute. Kurzon v. Union Ry. Co., 21 N. Y. S.
(2d) 310 (City Ct., 1940).
In denying the owner's right to indemnity, this court does not hold that he has
no such right at all, but seems merely to claim that such right cannot be based on
14. International News Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 245 (1918).
15. Id. at 239.
16. Id. at 235.
17. National Pub. Co. v. John A. Hertel Co., 105 F. (2d) 222 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939);
Cheyney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. (2d) 279 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Misler Safe Co.
v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 273 U. S. 132 (1927); Gotham Music Service Inc. v. Denton &
Haskins, 259 N. Y. 86, 181 N. E. 57 (1932); Crump Co. Inc. v. Lindsay Inc., 130 Va. 144,
107 S. E. 679 (1921); see Chafee, note 9 supra at 1315. In Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287
U. S. 315, 319 (1932), the Supreme Court in referring to the News case remarked: "Beyond
the tradifional boundaries of the common law only some imperative justification in policy
will lead the courts to recognize in old values new property rights'
iS. U. S. ComnsT. Anr. I, § 8.
1. N. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law (1929) § 59.
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the statute as the cross-complaint alleged it to be.2 This suggests the question
whether the right to indemnity exists independent of the statute. The answer to be
drawn from the cases seems to be that the right does exist, whether the plaintiffs
liability was statutory or not. Hence it seems that the cross-complaint was sufficient.
Where no statute is involved, courts have held that a person who has a liability
brought upon him due solely to another's negligence must be indemnified by the
wrongdoer.3 It cannot be said that the fact that a statute places liability on the
party who did not occasion the harm, will be a bar to his recovery over against the
actual tortfeasor. In the Staples Case4 an employee was injured through the negli-
gence of a drilling company doing work on the employer's premises. Under the
Compensation Law,6 the employer was liable for injuries to the employee. It was
held, that in a suit by the employer against the drilling company, the former had a
right to be indemnified by the party actually responsible for the injury to the em-
ployee even though the employer's liability was statutory.0 In other cases involving
Workman's Compensation Laws, the courts have granted indemnity to an innocent
person who was required to pay damages to an injured party.7
In the instant case the court said that if any cause of action could be made out
by the cross-complaint, it would have to be on a contractual theory or on the bailee's
duty to use due care toward third parties.8 The New York Court of Appeals seems
to have offered another ground in Oceanic S. N. Co. v. Compania Transallantica
Espanola.9 There the defendant permitted a boat to receive cargo at a certain pier.
While loading the cargo, a stevedore was injured by a silding door on the pier. He
sued the plaintiff who was lessee of the pier and recovered. The plaintiff then sued
the defendant for indemnity, and the court allowed a recovery. After citing Gray
v. Boston Gas Light Co.,10 and Churchill v. Holt," the court said, "Sufficient cases
2. Kurzon v. Union Ry. Co., 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 310, 313 (City Ct., 1940).
3. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Capital City Surety Co., 224 App. Div. 500, 231
N. Y. Supp. 169 (1st Dep't 1928) wherein the owner of a building was held liable as owner
for injuries to a third person caused by a tenant's negligence. The lessor was allowed
to recover against the lessee as the actual wrongdoer. Pullman Co. v. C.N.O. & T.P.R. Co.,
147 Ky. 498, 144 S. W. 385 (1912); Middlesboro Home Tel. Co. v. L. & N. R. Co. and
Tri State Tel. Co. v. L. & N. R. Co., 214 Ky. 822, 284 S. W. 104 (1926). A railroad
employee was injured by sagging telephone lines and recovered from his employer on the
theory that the latter should have discovered and corrected the negligent maintenance of
them. In both cases the party forced to pay damages to persons injured on their premises,
was allowed to recover over against the actual party who caused the injury.
4. Staples v. Central Surety Co., 62 F. (2d) 650 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
5. Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921) § 7282 et seq., as amended.
6. It should be noted that the employee's common law right to sue the drilling company
was abolished by the compensation law. Staples v. Central Surety Co., 62 F. (2d) 650,
653 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933). Under the N. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law (1929) § 59 the
injured party may sue either the driver or the owner of the automobile.
7. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes Eng. Co., 184 Fed. 426 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911);
Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse E. & Mfg. Co., 287 Fed. 439 (C. C. A. 6th,
1923).
8. Kurzon v. Union Ry. Co., 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 310, 313 (City Ct., 1940).
9. 134 N. Y. 461, 31 N. E. 987 (1892).
10. 114 Mass. 149 (1873).
11. 127 Mass. 165 (1879).
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have been cited to show that one.., held legally for the personal neglect of another
is entitled to indemnity from the latter, no matter whether contractual relations
existed between them or not, and that the right to indemnity does not depend upon
the fact that defendant owed the plaintiff a special or particular legal duty not to be
negligent. The right to indemnity stands upon the principle that everyone is re-
sponsible for the consequences of his own negligence and if another person has been
compelled ... to pay damages which ought to have been paid by the wrongdoer, they
may be recovered from him. ' -'
Upon the above stated cases it may be that the owner in the instant case could
have drawn a successful cross-complaint based on the responsibility attaching to one
whose sole and proximate negligence causes another to be held liable because of either
a statutory or common law duty.13 The statute compelled the owner to pay damages
caused by his bailee and the owner seeks to relieve himself of this obligation by an
action over against the bailee.14 In the Staples Caselu the same situation appeared
and the person who had the statutory duty of liability to his employee was permitted
to sue the tortfeasor successfully in a later action. Perhaps even as dravn the cross-
complaint was sufficient. True it was based on the statute and the statute doesn't
provide for indemnity to the owner. But it apparently alleged the negligence of the
driver of the automobile and the freedom from actual negligence of the defendant
owner. That is all that was required in the Staples Case and in the cases referred to
therein. The possibility that the owner and driver might be considered joint tort-
feasors and thus unable to sue each other except for contribution is suggested by the
court.16 But authority is not lacking to support the view that where the owner's
liability is a vicarious one, and he is himself free from actual negligence ha may
have complete indemnity.17
To simplify the matter, Section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law might be
amended to specifically allow the owner to be indemnified by the negligent driver
of the car. The section was enacted to protect the public from irresponsible drivers.
12. Oceanic S. N. Co. v. Compania Tranatlantica Espanola, 134 N. Y. 461, 467, 31
N. E. 987, 988 (1892).
13. For a collection of cases and other authorities on this viev.-point see Bohlen,
Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (1937) 22 Cow;. L. Q. 469; (1935) 4
FoRDHa= L. REv. 137.
14. N. Y. Vehicle and .Traffic Law (1929) § 59.
15. Staples v. Central Surety Co., 62 F. (2d) 650 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
16. Kurzon v. Union Ry. Co., 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 310, 313 (City Ct. 1940).
17. A Georgia cotton company was permitted to recover over against the defendant
power company for injuries to a third person caused by the defendant and for which in-
juries plaintiff had paid damages. The defendant's argument that the parties were joint
tortfeasors and could not sue each other was discarded by the court since the defendant's
proximate and sole negligence caused the injury. Georgia Power Co. v. Banning Cotton
lills, 42 Ga. App. 671, 157 S. E. 525 (1931). See also Harper, Torts (1933) 631, Cooley,
Torts (Student Ed., 1930) 186; for the view that joint tortfeasors cannot sue each other,
see Merryweather v. Nbxon, 8 T. R. 186 (1799); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Macon Ry.
& Light Co., 140 Ga. 309, 78 S. E. 931 (1913); Bohlen, Contribution and Irdev.rity Be-
tween Tortfeasors (1936) 21 Coru;. L. Q. 522.
Where the party held liable was guilty of a passive tort (failure to use due care), he
was allowed to file a cross-complaint against the active tortfeasor for indemnity. Nev.
Nueces Hotel Co. v. Sorenson, 124 Tex. 175, 76 S. W. (2d) 483, 491 (1934).
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Why not also extend protection to the owner in the cases where the driver is.
financially responsible and the injured third party elects to sue the owner?
INsURANCE-RENSTATEMENT--GOOD FAITH OF REPRESENTATION CONCERNING
HEALTH OF INSURED IN APPLICATION.-On May 4, 1933 the insured, stating that he
was in good health, applied in writing for reinstatement of a life policy, which had
lapsed on May 1 for nonpayment of a premium due. The policy provided that it
could be reinstated only "upon evidence of insurability satisfactory to the company".
On May 6, the defendant insurer received the application. About a week after
the application for reinstatement was received, the insured consulted a doctor, and
was advised to go to a hospital for examination. On May 19, he was operated on
for a tumor of the brain and died the same day. On that day one of the defendant's
agents, having learned that the insured was being operated on, informed him that
his policy would not be reinstated because evidence of insurability was not satis-
factory to the company. In an action on the policy by the beneficiary, the jury's
verdict was for plaintiff, having found that the insured acted honestly and that the
insurer delayed an unreasonable length of time in acting on the application for
reinstatement, but the court directed verdict for defendant. On appeal, from a
judgment of the Appellate Court, affirming the judgment entered for defendant
notwithstanding jury verdict for plaintiff, held, two judges dissenting, recovery may
be allowed on reinstated life policy on ground that the insured acted in good fail/
in stating that he was in good health, and the insurer delayed an unreasonable time
in acting on application for reinstatement. Judgment reversed. Froehler v. North
America Life Insurance Company of Chicago, 317 Ill. 17, 27 N. E. (2d) 833 (1940).
In general, the rights of the insured after a forfeiture of the policy for non-
payment of premiums are dependent upon the provisions of the contract. 1 The
right to reinstatement is not absolute 2 and the insurer may impose such conditions
as it sees fit, if not contrary to public policy.3 Compliance with the conditions
1. N. Y. INS. LAw § 208, grants specific rights to an insured after three full year's
premiums have been paid and a default has occurred in the payment of a premium.
These optional rights are as follows:
(1) Upon the surrender of the lapsed policy within 3 months from the due date of
the payment in default, the insured shall be entitled to receive a cash surrender value of
such policy (which is to be computed as regulated by the section).
(2) In lieu of such cash surrender value, the insured may elect to receive either
extended term insurance or reduced paid up insurance under the policy for an amount
(in the case of reduced paid up insurance) and for a term (in the case of extended term
insurance), which in either case, shall be not less than that provided by applying such
cash surrender value at the date of default to provide such extended term or paid-up
insurance.
(3) If within 3 months after the due date of the premium in default, the insured
selects no other option expressed in the policy, the amount of such non-forfeiture value
shall be applied to continue the insurance in force from the due date of the premium in
default as extended insurance.
For a discussion of such rights see COOLEY's BRars ON IxsuRANCE (2d ed. 1927) pp.
3775-3856.
2. Hayes v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 236 Mass. 476, 128 N. E. 780 (1920).
CoucH ON INsuRANcE (1930) § 1375.
3. Supreme Lodge of Fraternal Brotherhood v. Grijalva, 27 Ariz. 77, 235 Pac. 397
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gives the delinquent insured an absolute right to reinstatement. 4 The first condi-
tion usually required to procure a reinstatement is the payment by the insured
of the amount of his arrears.5 The second usual condition is proof of the good
health or insurability of the applicant.0 Where the policy contains such a condi-
tion, payment of the arrears alone is not sufficient to procure the reinstatement, but
the insured must furnish the required proof of good health.7 MTaere a forfeited
policy is revived by reinstatement, the effect is not the making of a new contract,
but the cancellation of the forfeiture and the revival of the original contract.8
Since in the principal case the insurer was held liable on the reinstated policy,
it is interesting to examine the theory on which said policy was reinstated. The
majority of the court considered the lapsed policy reinstated because the insurer
failed to give the insured notice of its action on the application for reinstatement
within a reasonable time.9 Liability of an insurer for failing to act on applications
for reinstatement with reasonable celerity has been recognized by many courts, al-
though they disagree with respect to the underlying reason.1 0
(1925). Requirement of good health and warranty thereof as condition for reinstatement
not unreasonable. Saerwein v. Jamon, 32 Misc. 701, 65 N. Y. Supp. 501 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
4. Boward v. Bankers' Union of the World, 94 Mo. App. 442, 68 S. V. 369 (1902).
Dennis v. Massachusetts Benefit Ass'n, 47 Hun. 338, aff'd, 120 N. Y. 496, 24 N. E. 843
(1890). Policy provided that upon default for non-payment of premium insured could
be reinstated "for valid reasons". Insured did not pay assessment on time becau e he
was stricken with apoplexy, held, insured entitled to reinstatement. The reason was valid.
5. A partial payment of back dues on a lapsed policy will not work a reinstatement of
the insurance under a stipulation for reinstatement on the payment of "all back dues".
Melvin v. Piedmopt Mutual Life Ins. Co., 150 N. C. 398, 64 S. E. 120 (1909).
6. Such condition is reasonable and valid. Supreme Lodge of Fraternal Brotherhood
v. Grijalva, 27 Ariz. 77, 235 Pac. 397 (1925); Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Lambert, 228
Ala. 440, 153 So. 627 (1934). See Couca o,; LNsuwi=cn (1930) § 1377 for a compre-
hensive study of the question of good health as a condition precedent to reinstatement.
7. Kennedy v. Grand Fraternity, 36 Mont. 325, 92 Pac. 971 (1907); Goud v. The
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S., 231 N. Y. 208, 131 N. E. 892 (1921)
reversing 188 App. Div. 318 (3rd Dep't 1919). Coucu o,; IsuUcz (1930) § 1377.
Not withstanding the general rule that conditions prescribed for reinstatement must be
complied with, the insurer may waive such conditions, if he sees fit to do so. Thus a
requirement that there must be a written application for reinstatement may be waived.
Gaige v. The Grand Lodge of the Ancient Order of United Workmen of the State of
N. Y., 48 Hun. 137 (1888). So, too, the insurer may waive the condition requiring a
certificate of good health by refusing reinstatement on other grounds without objecting
to the sufficiency of the certificate. Miesell v. The Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co., 76 N. Y.
115 (1879).
8. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McTague, 49 N. J. L. 587, 9 AUt. 766 (18S7). Coucr
ox Iisuan'cn (1930) § 1378.
9. See Waldmer v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 149 Kan. 237, 87 P. (2d) 515 (1939), holding
that question of whether insurer acted within reasonable time was for jury. McWilliams
v. Liberty Ind. Life Ins. Co., 142 So. 914 (La. App. 1932). Delay of fifteen days was
unreasonable.
10. Various reasons are advanced: (a) Some courts say that unreasonable delay in
responding to an application operates as a waiver of the incurred forfeiture. Rocky
Mountain Savings and Trust Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 199 N. C. 465, 154 S. E. 743 (1930);
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This being the majority theory, the principal case would not be unusual except
for the fact that it raises the questions: What is the effect of a false statement
as to the health of the insured in an application for reinstatement? What is the
effect of the failure of such an applicant to disclose a condition of ill-health after
it comes to his knowledge? It was the insurer's contention that it was immaterial
whether the insured actually had knowledge of his ill health at the time he signed
the application for reinstatement if he was then actually in ill health. The insurer's
principal reliance was the case of Western & Souther?t Life Ins. Co. v. Tomasum,11
wherein the court held that it is well settled law that a material misrepresentation
in an application for original insurance, whether intentionally and knowingly or
through mistake and in good faith, will avoid the policy. However, the majority
court in the instant case distinguished that case in two respects: first, on their
facts, because the Tomasum case involved an absolute and intentional fraud and
second, because, on the ground that in the Tomasurn case no contract ever existed
between the parties. In the principal case, there is involved a question of per-
formance of an existing contract. In other words the Tomasum case involved
original insurance but the principal case involved reinstated insurance. Therefore,
the principal case holds that the effect of a false statement as to health in an
application for reinstatement depends on the intent of the insured, and, if good
faith is exercised the mere fact that the statements are false will not avoid the
policy. 12 In this respect, then, this holding is opposed to the cases deciding that
(b) Others say that the offer of the insured is accepted by a prolonged silence on the
part of the insurer. Lechler v. Montana Life Ins. Co., 148 N. D. 644, 186 N. W. 271
(1921); (c) Other courts daim that a contractual duty to reinstate the policy upon
specific conditions implies a contractual duty to decide whether the conditions have been
met and to inform the applicant of the decision within a reasonable time. Leonard v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 128 Wis. 348, 107 N. W. 646 (1906); (d) A fourth theory proceeds
on the idea that a duty on the part of the insurer to deal expeditiously with an appli-
cation for reinstatement arises not out of contract or waiver, but by virtue of a
peculiar social relationship. Note (1930) 40 YAL. L. J. 121; Condon v. Exton-Hall, 80
Misc. 369, 142 N. Y. Supp. 548 (City Ct. 1913); Steiner v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of U. S.. 146 Misc. 292, 295, 262 N. Y. Supp. 11 (Sup. Ct. 1932). This Is the
only New York case which has passed squarely upon the issue. The court does not adopt
any of the foregoing theories as the basis for the rule, but states that "the compelling
point to be considered is whether the defendant (insurer) in this case was under any
duty, whether arising out of contract or otherwise, to notify the insured within a reason-
able time of the action taken on his application".
11. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Tomasum, 358 Ill. 496, 193 N. E. 451 (1934).
In this case, the insured in an application for original insurance, intentionally and delib-
erately stated that she had never been operated on, that she was never treated for cancer,
that she had never had any disease of the breast, ovaries or uterus. In fact insured had
cancer, had undergone an operation for the removal of her uterus, tubes and ovaries.
12. For other cases to the same effect see: Mulligan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 76 Conn.
676, 58 At. 230 (1904); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Rehlaender, 68 Neb. 284, 94, N. W. 129
(1903); Doyle v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 126 S. IV. (2d) 735 (Texas 1939). See
Baxter v. N. Y. Life, 115 Pa. Super. 287, 175 At. 899 (1934) holding that insurer seeking
forfeiture of life policy for misrepresentation in application for reinstatement has burden
of showing false statements knowingly made with deliberate intent to deceive. N. Y. Life
v. Kincaid, 122 Fla. 283, 165 So. 553 (1936), holding that question of good faith of
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a false representation in an application for reinstatement, whether innocent or fraudu-
lent, will, if material, render a contract of insurance voidable.13
Although the theory of these latter cases is fortified by the recent revision of
the Insurance Law in New York,14 the principal case seems to expound the better
rule. In the case of an original application for insurance, a false representation,
whether innocent or fraudulent, will render a contract of insurance voidable, not
because of fraud, but because the loss which the insurer is called upon to indemnify
falls under a risk different from that assumed.'3 When there is a reinstatement,
the insurer by taking the original contract had already assumed the risk of a future
unforseen disease striking the applicant who was in good health when the insurance
was originally applied for. The insurer is not now called upon to indemnify against
a different risk. His financial arrangements to meet the risk are not upset. All
the premiums he thought necessary are to be paid. Thus it seems that in the case
of an application for reinstatement the rule should be that a false representation
will avoid the policy only when made with the intent to deceive, thus making fraud
the only ground for avoiding a reinstatement. The reinstatement of a policy of
life insurance, after a default in payment of premiums, is a different transaction
from the original making of the contract for the insurance. The policy has lapsed
and is in abeyance, but the right of the insured to have the policy reinstated upon
complying with conditions remains. The original contract was a contract for in-
surance against unforseen diseases. The reinstatement contract is one to revive
that insurance against unforeseen diseases.
insured in answering questions in relation to insurability in application for reinstatement
of policy was for jury. See Robbind v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co, 195 Minn. 205, 262 N. NV.
210 (1935).
13. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 174 Ala. 511, 56 So. 568 (1911); Empire Life Ins.
Co. v. Gee, 178 Ala. 492, 60 So. 90 (1912). See Sommer v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,
281 N. Y. 50S, 24 N. E. (2d) 30S (1939); and Eastern District P. D. Works, Inc. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 234 N. Y. 441, 138 N. E. 401 (1923) for N. Y. cases squarely holding
that in an action on a reinstated life policy, a false representation, if material, constitutes
a good defense although made innocently and without any feature of fraud. These states
hold that a misrepresentation as to the health of the insured in an application for rein-
statement will avoid the policy in the same manner as a misrepresentation in an appli-
cation for original insurance.
14. N. Y. LNs. LAW §§ 142 (3), 149 (1), (2). A material false statement in an
application for reinstatement would as effectually void a policy of insurance as a similar
statement in the original application itself. Schrader v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 232 App. Div. 644, 251 N. Y. Supp. 169 (1st Dep't 1931) affg 137 Misc. 280, 242
N. Y. Supp. 181 (City Ct. 1930). Representations in an application, if material and
untrue, would viatate the life policy, notwithstanding absence of fraudulent intent.
Entian v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 155 Misc. 227, 279 N. Y. Supp.
580 (CiV Ct. 1935). See also, Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co.. 247 App. Div. C07,
288 N. Y. Supp. 359 (4th Dep't 1936). Even an innocent misrepresentation would avoid
a policy if it materially affected acceptance of the risk and hazard assumed by the
insurer. Piccininni v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 250 App. Div. 498, 294 N. Y. Supp. 850 (2d
Dep't 1931). False representations in an application for a life policy, if material, would
void the policy, if it was contestable. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Schusterman,
255 App. Di-. 54, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 368 (1st Dep't 1938).
15. V -'ncE LwsuRANcF (1904) 267-8.
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The chief argument of the dissent is that there should be no recovery because
the insured failed to disclose to the insurer his condition of health subsequent to
the making of the application for reinstatement. The dissent, after citing from
Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.," as authority for the proposition that the
insured is bound as a matter of good faith to inform the insurer of any material
change in his condition of health between the date of application and date of
delivery of policy, went on to say that although this rule applies to an original appli-
cation for insurance, "there seems to be no distinction in applying the rule where
used in connection with reinstatement as opposed to its use in taking out a new
policy".
The minority fails to cite, and seems to admit that there are no authorities in
support of its proposition. Furthermore, there seems to be a good reason why the
insured should not be required, in a case of reinstated insurance, to inform the
insurer of changes in his health subsequent to the making of the application for
reinstatement. The reasoning is similar to that above. When the original insurance
was issued the insurance company assumed the risk that the insured might be struck
down with an unforeseen disease, and the insurance company, having cognizance of
this fact adequately protects itself against such risks in computing the amount
of the insured's premiums. It sets aside in reserve a predetermined percentage of
the premiums received, to be used for the purpose of paying off such unforeseen risks
when they materialize. The reinstatement only revives the original policy and
the company's financial machinery is geared to cover any loss under it. Failure
to inform the company of a change of health under a standing policy would not
avoid it. The company's position on a revived policy is no different from what it
would be as insurer on a long established standing policy. Conceding that on original
applications, there is a continuous representation of the insured that his health is as
robust when the insurance goes into effect as when the application for insurance
was made and the medical examination had,' 7 in the case of an application for rein-
statement, the representations of the insured as to the condition of his health are
not continuous but are limited to the time of the application.18
LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANT TO REPAIR-COVENANT TO INSURE.-A cove-
nant in a 20-year lease entered into in 1920 bound the lessee to keep buildings in
repair, to rebuild in the event of their destruction by fire and to insure them against
fire during the life thereof. A building of the value of $1000 was detroyed by fire
on September 5, 1921, another of the value of $4000 on February 22, 1929. The
lessee was carrying fire insurance on the buildings when they were destroyed and
was paid the insurance money. He retained it to his own benefit and use. He
refused to rebuild. The plaintiffs brought an action to enforce the covenant, which
the lessee claims is premature as he is not obligated to rebuild until the end of
the term. On certificate of questions, held, two of the judges dissenting, the duty
16. Stipcich v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 277 U. S. 311 (1938).
17. Robbins v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 195 Minn. 205, 262 N. W. 210 (1935). For an
interesting note on this case, see (1936) 11 Wis. L. Rev. 447.
18. Insurance Co. v. Higginbotham, 95 U. S. 380 (1877). As in the case of an original
application for insurance, a recital in the certificate for reinstatement that the insured is
in good health cannot be construed to mean that he has no temporary or trivial Indis-
position. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McTague, 49 N. J. L. 587, 9 Atl. 766 (1887).
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to rebuild, operating as a part of the covenant to keep in repair, was continuous
and the plaintiffs need not wait until the end of the term to bring action. Campbell
et al. v. Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co., 9 S. E. (2d) 135 (1940).
A certified question inter alia was whether a cause of action for violating a cove-
nant to rebuild accrued to the lessors before the e.xpiration of the lease. The court
in the instant case is concerned with the construction of a lease as set forth in an
amended declaration. The obligations devolving on the lessee under the terms of
the lease, were (1) to keep the buildings on the premises as of the date of the lease
in good repair, (2) to keep the property insured against loss or damage by fire, (3)
to replace the said buildings in the event of their destruction or injury by fire during
the term of the lease. Does such a covenant indicate an intention of the parties
to bind the lessee to immediately rebuild buildings destroyed by fire?
The general rule is that the intention of the parties as gathered from the language
used in the covenant should control its construction. The different provisions in
an instrument should be read together, where they deal with the same subject matter,
and wherever possible all the language used should be given reasonable meaning.1
Both opinions overlook an interesting point concerning the intention of the parties.
The intention of the parties that the risk of loss by fire was to fall upon the lessee
is clearly indicated by the terms of the covenant. Yet if the defendant is permitted
to delay rebuilding until the end of the term, the lessor must bear considerable
risk of loss. The primary purpose of a provision for fire insurance is for the addi-
tional security of the landlord2 by providing ready funds with which to rebuild.
It is apparent then that the lessor did not wish to rely solely on the general credit
of the lessee to provide funds for rebuilding. If such was his wish, the insertion
of a provision for insurance would be unnecessary. Yet if the lessee is not required
to rebuild immediately, the lessors would be forced to rely upon the general credit
of the lessee for periods of 19 and 11 years, following the destruction of the two
buildings. The sums collected on the insurance would be subject to the lessee's
creditors and his general business risks during all this period. It seems then that
the provision for insurance can be interpreted only as requiring that the funds be
devoted immediately to rebuilding.
The complainant seemed to contend3 that the language of the lease providing
that the lessee would "replace any of the structures on the said premises .. . which
should be destroyed or injured by fire during the life thereof" imposed on the lessee
the obligation of replacing destroyed property duing the life of the lease, and pro-
hibited him from waiting until the end of the term. The defendant's answer 4
seemed to be that the words "during the life thereof" referred to the phrase imme-
diately preceding, i.e., "structures ...detroyed or injured by fire." In other words
the defendant admitted he was bound to replace structures destroyed daing the life
1. Codman v. Highgrade Products Corp., 295 Mass. 195, 3 N. E. (2d) 759, 761 (1936);
In re Loew's Buffalo Theatres, 233 N. Y. 495, 135 N. E. 862 (1922); Orr v. Doubleday
Paige & Co., 223 N. Y. 334, 341, 119 N. E. 552, 553 (1918).
2. "The covenant to insure was introduced for the security of the landlord, leaving
the tenant absolutely liable on the covenant to repair." Digby v. Atkinson, 4 Camp.
275, 171 Eng. Reprints 88, 89 (1815).
3. Campbell et al. v. Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co., 9 S. E. (2d) 135, 137
(1940).




of the lease but would not concede that they were to be replaced during the life of
the lease. He rather contended that he could wait until the end of the term.
This construction of the defendant adds nothing to his liability. His liability
necessarily is limited by contract to buildings destroyed by fire during the term of
the lease. No one would infer that a lessee must replace buildings destroyed before
or after the term of his lease. It would have been useless to insert the language to
guard against such an implication. By the plaintiff's construction the language is
given legal meaning and conforms to the duty to keep the premises insured and to
"keep in repair."5 This construction is supported by the continuity of the duties to
insure and to repair as is shown by the use of the word "keep."
The majority opinion is also based upon the interpretation of a statute limiting
the common law with reference to the duty to keep in repair. At common law,
when a tenant covenanted to keep the premises in repair, without providing an
exception for damages by fire or the elements, the covenant to repair was held to
include the duty to rebuild. When destruction occurred the tenant was bound to
rebuild even though the premises were destroyed without fault on his part.7 It
was to relieve against this harsh result that the Code of West Virginia8 provided
that no covenant to repair shall require the replacement of, or payment for, build-
ings destroyed by fire without fault of the tenant "unless there be other words show-
ing it to be the intent of the party that he should be so bound,"0
The court in the principal case reasoned that such additional language was used
in the covenant to repair in question to show that it was the intention of the parties
that the lessee be bound to rebuild in the event of fire. The additional language
used in the covenant to repair operates as a subordinate part of that covenant. The
duty of compliance in a covenant to keep in repair is continuous.10 Repairs must
be made within a reasonable time or the covenant is breached and on breach an
action lies at once.
5. When a lessee is bound to keep the premises in repair he must have them In repair
at all times during the term; and if they are at any time out of repair he is guilty of
breach of covenant. Luxmore v. Robinson, 1 Barn. & Aid. 584 (1818).
6. Keep is defined "To cause to continue without essential change; maintain; .. . to
continue in a condition, position . . .or course of action unchanged." FUNx & WAGNALLS
DIcONARY (1930).
7. Bullock v. Dommet, 6 T. R. 650, 101 Eng. Reprints 752 (1796); Poole v. Archer,
Skin. 210, 89 Eng. Reprints 1007 (1684); Digby v. Atkinson, 4 Camp. 275, 171 Eng.
Reprints 88 (1815); Earl of Chesterfield v. Duke of Bolton, 2 Comyn. 627, 92 Eng.
Reprints 1241 (1739).
Where a lease contained a covenant to leave a mill in repair, on destruction It was
held that the lessee was bound to rebuild. Ross v. Overton, 3 Call. 309, 2 Amer. Dec.
552 (Va. 1802). A lease contained a covenant to keep buildings in repair and to surrender
them at the end of the term in as good condition as when the lease was made. The
lessee was bound to make good all the damage resulting from an accidental fire. Abby
v. Billups, 35 Miss. 618, 72 Amer. Dec. 143 (1858).
8. ,Vmsr VA. CoDo (1931) c. 36 art. 4. § 13.
9. Ibid.
10. A tenant breached a covenant not to alter. Action was held to lie Immediately.
The plaintiff need not await the end of the term. Webster v. Nosser, 2 Daly 186 (N. Y.
1867). On a covenant to keep the premises in good repair and at the expiration of the
lease to deliver them up in like condition, held, an action will lie at once following a breach
and it is unnecessary to wait until the end of the term. Schieffelin v. Carpenter, 15
Wend. 400 (N. Y. 1836).
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NUIsANcE-ZoNING LAW-INUNCTON TO RESTRAn PnovosED Op mxxoN.-The
defendant sought to erect an undertaking establishment in a restricted retail district
under sanction of the zoning laws. Residents of the district complain that the pro-
posed operation and use of such a business will constitute a nuisance, and seek a
permanent injunction. The complaint was dismissed at special term on the ground
that an undertaking business is not necessarily a nuisance. On appeal from an
affirmance of the dismissal by the appellate division, Ild, three judges dissenting,
the plaintiffs may prove that the proposed use is a nuisance before operations begin.
Sweet et al. v. Campbell et al., 282 N. Y. 146, 25 N. E. (2d) 963.
The majority contends that the plaintiffs have a right to prove that the proposed
operation of an undertaking business will constitute a nuisance despite the fact that
the establishment of such a business is permitted by law. The minority, on the other
hand, believe that an undertaking establishment is not a nuisance per se, and although
the manner of operation may make it one, it cannot be established in advance that
it will be so operated. This decision posits a unique proposition which is certain
to have serious repercussions. The proposition may be stated as follows: The estab-
lishment of a legitimate business may be enjoined prior to its operation on the
ground that it will be operated in such a way as to constitute a nuisance. The court
holds that the plaintiff cannot be denied a present right to challenge the defendant's
future conduct.
The rule of law which this court now declares, appears to be somewhat unusual.
In Goelet v. Moss,2 the plaintiff sought a permit to erect a theatre in a locality where
such a business was designated as lawful by the zoning laws. It was refused on
the grounds that real estate values would be depreciated thereby. Mandamus was
held to lie to compel the defendant to grant the application. In its decision, the
court made the following illuminating statement: "We hold that the zoning law is
the controlling authority as to what uses the owners may make of their property
in a given district." To the same effect is Bove v. Bonner-Hanna Coke Corp.3 where
the court refused to enjoin as a nuisance the operation of a coke oven in the area
authorized by the zoning laws on the ground that it was not the function of the
court to condemn as a nuisance a business which is being conducted it at approved
manner in the very locality where by law it has a right to be. From these cases
we may, at least, deduce the proposition that if a lawful business is lawfully estab-
lished in a particular locality it cannot be enjoined as a nuisance when it is operated
properly. Now it is well established that an undertaking business is not a nuisance
in itself.4 It seems from this that an undertaking business can be conducted properly.
1. By a rule of construction, zoning laws permit those businesses which are not
specifically excluded. The business in question was not expressly excluded; therefore, it
was permitted. Matter of Monument Garage Corp. v. Levy, 266 N. Y. 339, 194 N. E.
S48 (1935); Matter of Goelet v. Moss, 273 N. Y. 503, 6 N. E. (2d) 425 (1937); Kirk
v. Mabis, 215 Iowa 769, 246 N. W. 759 (1933); Stoddard v. Snodgras, 117 Ore. 262,
241 Pac. 73 (1925).
2. 248 App. Div. 499, 290 N. Y. Supp. 573 (1st Dep't 1936), affld 273 N. Y. 303,
6 N. E. (2d) 425 (1937).
3. 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N. Y. Supp. 229 (4th Dep't 1932).
4. Heimerle v. Village of Bronxville, 16S Misc. 783, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 1002 (Sup. Ct.
1938), aff'd 256 App. Div. 993, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 367 (2d Dep't 1939); Nevins v. McGavock,
214 Ala. 93, 106 So. 597 (1925); Junction City Lumber Co. v. Sharp, 92 Ark. 538, 123
S. W. 370 (1909); Sullivan v. Royer, 72 Cal. 248, 13 Pac. 655 (1887).
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Hence a complaint which alleges that it will be conducted improperly is based on
speculation.5 It seems imprudent to give plaintiff an opportunity to assume a
prophetic role and to condemn as a nuisance the proposed operation of a business
in the very locality where by law it has a right to be.
There is a doctrine in the law (which has received some support from New York
and other jurisdictions) known as "legalization of nuisances." It may throw some
light on the problem. Under this doctrine, broadly speaking, acts which normally
would be held nuisances are deemed lawful, if they are sanctioned by the legislature.
However, the rule that what the statutory law authorizes can be a nuisance does not
apply if it constitutes a violation of due process of law under Amendments V and
XIV of the Federal Constitution. 6 Where the law authorizes the doing of a certain
act which would be a nuisance if not so authorized, an action to abate it as a Public
nuisance cannot be brought if the sanctioning statute is constitutional.1 However,
the sanctioning act cannot confer any authority to conduct a business so as to con-
stitute a private nuisance.8 In other words, while the legislature may legalize an
5. There have been cases where the courts have refused to enjoin the proposed operation
of enterprises on mere speculative representation by the plaintiff that operation will con-
stitute a nuisance resulting in irreparable harm. Heaton v. Packer, 131 App. Div. 812,
116 N. Y. Supp. 46 (1st Dep't 1909); Sherman v. Livingston, 128 N. Y. Supp. 581 (Sup.
Ct. 1910). Indeed, where the erection of a building for business purposes is enjoined It
is generally held that regardless of a permissive zoning ordinance, in order to justify an
injunction, it must appear that it will necessarily constitute a nuisance. Rhodes v. Dunbar,
57 Pa. 274, 98 Am. Dec. 221 (1868); Wolcott v. Melick, 11 N. J. Eq. 204, 66 Am. Dec.
790 (1856); Moore v. Adams, 141 S. W. (2d) 46 (Ark. 1940). In addition, some jurisdic-
tions maintain that if a business establishment is legally authorized, injunctive relief will
not be granted in the absence of negligence in operation. Linsler v. Booth Undertaking
Co., 120 Wash. 177, 206 Pac. 976 (1922); White v. Luquire Funeral Home, 221 Ala. 440,
129 So. 84 (1930).
6. Hairston v. Danville & West. Ry. Co., 208 U. S. 598, 605 (1908); Williams v. N. Y.
Central R.R. Co., 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 222, reversed on othe& grounds 16 N. Y. 97, 69 Am.
Dec. 651 (1857); Matter of Eaton v. Sweeny, 257 N. Y. 176. In England, what the law
authorizes cannot be a nuisance either public or private. Parliament is supreme and not
subject to constitutional limitations in respect to private rights as are the legislatures of
this country. Therefore, if Parliament authorizes the taking of private property, or the
doing of an act which is a private nuisance, and provides no compensation therefor, the
courts can give no redress. Vaughan v. Taff Vale Ry. Co., 5 H. & N. 679, 685 (1858);
Managers of Metropolitan Asylum Dist. v. Hill, 6 App. Cas. 193 (1881).
7. Kobbe v. City of New Brighton, 20 Misc. 477, 45 N. Y. Supp. 777 (Sup. Ct. 1897),
aff'd 23 App. Div. 243, 48 N. Y. S. 990 (2d Dep't 1897); Spring v. Delaware L. & W.
Ry. Co., 88 Hun. 385, 34 N. Y. Supp. 810 (Sup. Ct. 1895), aff'd 157 N. Y. 692, 51 N. E.
1094 (1898); Bohan v. Gaslight Co., 122 N. Y. 18, 25 N. E. 246 (1890); Arverne Bay
Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N. Y. 222, 15 N. E. (2d) 587 (1938). A special rule applies
where a municipal corporation does an act in the performance of a public duty by express
legislative authority. In such a case, the legislature may legalize an act which would be a
private nuisance as between individuals provided the statutory sanction is clear and
unambiguous. Cogswell v. R.R. Co., 103 N. Y. 10, 8 N. E. 537 (1886); Hill v. City
of New York, 139 N. Y. 495, 34 N. E. 1090 (1893); Squaw Island Freight Terminal v.




act which would be a nuisance otherwise, it cannot authorize the "taking" of private
property for a public use without just compensation, nor deprive any person of his
property without due process of law. But before the Constitution will protect the
property owner, it must appear that there has been a "taking" of property which
is a "serious" impairment of his rights.0 This would seem to be the basis for the
proposition oft stated, that the legislature may not legalize large nuisances, but can
legalize small ones.10
It may be noted that these instances of immunity from the strict application of
the law of nuisance spring from specific legislative enactments. Yet it is possible
to draw an analogy to the case at bar. It involves zoning laws. These laws are
enacted in pursuance of the police power. They have legalized the undertaking
business involved. To become subject to injunction, the business must be a "serious"
infringement of the resident's property rights. Otherwise, it is a "small" nuisance
and immune under the doctrine discussed. It is hard to imagine how it may be
shown before operations begin that a legal business will be operated so as to "seri-
ously" impair the rights of the residents in the locality.
9. Sadlier v. City of N. Y., 40 Misc. 78, 81 N. Y. Supp. 303 (Sup. Ct. 1903), rcversed
on other grountds, 104 App. Div. 82, 93 N. Y. S. 579 (2nd Dept 1905), aff'd 185 N. Y.
403, 78 N. E. 272 (1906); Story v. N. Y. Elevated R.R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122 (1882). In
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922), Mr. justice Holmes pointed
out that "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." See People v. B'klyn
& Queens Transit Co., 283 N. Y. 484, 28 N. E. (2d) 925 (1940). In Sawyer v. Davis,
136 Mass. 239, 243 (1884) the court said: "Slight infractions of the natural rights of the
individual may be sanctioned by the legislature under the proper exercise of the police
powers, with a view to the public good." Bacon v. Boston, 154 Mass. 100, 102, 28 N. E.
10 (1891); Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 372, 19 N. E. 390, 392 (1889); Common-
wealth v. Parks, 155 Mass. 531, 532, 30 N. E. 174 (1892); Bent v. Emery, 173 Mas. 495,
496, 53 N. E. 910, 911 (1899).
10. Thus, in Saner v. City of N. Y., 180 N. Y. 27, 72 N. E. 579 (1904) the erection
of a viaduct was held not to constitute a public nuisance because it was authorized by
the legislature. The "Parking Meter" cases, see (1940) 9 FoRnsr,- L. R-v. 148, which are
upheld generally as a valid exercise of the police power, stand for the proposition that par!:-
ing meters do not constitute an illegal interference with an abutting owner's easement of
access to the highway. In so ruling, the courts appear to have legalized what might be called
a small nuisance. In State v. Burkett, 119 Md. 609, 87 Atl. 514 (1913), the mayor and
city council of Baltimore pursuant to an ordinance, established and licensed market stalls
in a city street which impeded free access to adjacent stores. The court, in upholding the
state, concluded that what the law authorized cannot be a nuisance.
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